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BOYCOTT
A boycott is a group refusal to deal. Such concerted action
is an effective way for society’s less powerful members,
such as unorganized workers or racial minorities, to seek
fair treatment in employment, public accommodations,
and public services. But as the Supreme Court recognized
in Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Association v.
United States (1914): ‘‘An act harmless when done by one
may become a public wrong when done by many acting in
concert, for it then takes on the form of a conspiracy.’’
Boycotts by private entrepreneurs were illegal at common law as unreasonable restraints on commercial competition. The Sherman Act of 1890 made it a federal
offense to form a ‘‘combination . . . in restraint of trade.’’

BOYD v. UNITED STATES
The Supreme Court has interpreted that prohibition as
covering almost every type of concerted refusal by business people to trade with others. The constitutionality of
outlawing commercial boycotts has never seriously been
questioned.
Employee boycotts may be either ‘‘primary’’ or ‘‘secondary.’’ A primary boycott involves direct action against
a principal party to a dispute. A union seeking to organize
a company’s work force may call for a strike, a concerted
refusal to work, by the company’s employees. A secondary
boycott involves action against a so-called neutral or secondary party that is doing business with the primary party.
The union seeking to organize a manufacturing company
might appeal to the employees of a retailer to strike the
retailer in order to force the retailer to stop handling the
manufacturer’s products.
Although early American law regarded most strikes as
criminal conspiracies, modern statutes like the WAGNER NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT (NLRA) treat primary strikes
in the private sector as ‘‘protected’’ activity, immune from
employer reprisals. Even so, the Supreme Court has never
held there is a constitutional right to strike. Furthermore,
the Court sustained the constitutionality of statutory bans
on secondary boycott strikes or related picketing in Electrical Workers Local 501 v. NLRB (1951). The use of
group pressure to enmesh neutrals in the disputes of others was sufficient to enable government to declare such
activity illegal.
Consumer boycotts present the hardest constitutional
questions. Here group pressure may not operate directly,
as in the case of a strike. Instead, the union or other protest group asks individual customers, typically acting on
their own, not to patronize the subject firm. Yet if the
appeal is to customers of a retailer not to shop there so
long as the retailer stocks a certain manufacturer’s goods,
a neutral party is the target. The NLRA forbids union PICKETING to induce such a secondary consumer boycott. The
Supreme Court held this limited prohibition constitutional in NLRB V. RETAIL CLERKS LOCAL 1001 (1980), although
there was no majority rationale. A plurality cited precedent concerning secondary employee boycotts, ignoring
the differences between individual and group responses.
On the other hand, when a civil rights organization conducted a damaging boycott against white merchants to
compel them to support demands upon elected officials
for racial equality, the Supreme Court declared in NAACP
V. CLAIBORNE HARDWARE CO. (1982) that a state’s right ‘‘to
regulate economic activity could not justify a complete
prohibition against a nonviolent, politically motivated boycott designed to force governmental and economic change
and to effectuate rights guaranteed by the Constitution
itself.’’ The Court relied on the FIRST AMENDMENT rights of
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION, and FREEDOM OF
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PETITION. The emphasis on the right to petition government raises the possibility of a different result if the merchants themselves, rather than the public officials, had
been the primary target of the boycott. But that would
appear incongruous. The Court needs to refine its constitutional analysis of consumer boycotts.
THEODORE J. ST. ANTOINE
(1986)
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